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"PREDICTIVE JUSTICE"?: SIMMONS V.
ROPER AND THE POSSIBLE END OF THE
JUVENILE DEATH PENALTY
S. Starling Marshall*
INTRODUCTION
Christopher Simmons of Missouri and Napoleon Beazley of Texas
were seventeen-years-old when they committed murder. They were
both convicted and sentenced to death, and they spent nearly the
same amount of time on death row.2 As inmates the two young men
expressed remorse, took part in religious activities and were model
prisoners.' It is these similarities, as the American Bar Association's
Juvenile Justice Center points out, which make the opposite outcomes
so dramatic.4 On May 28, 2002, the Missouri Supreme Court granted
Simmons a stay of execution and eventually overturned his death
sentence.' Beazley, however, on the same day Simmons was granted
his stay, was executed by the state of Texas.6 How can such an
inconsistency exist? This is an especially perplexing question when
one considers that Simmons's sentence was not overturned based on
his innocence.7 The Missouri Supreme Court held in State ex rel.
Simmons v. Roper that the juvenile death penalty was
unconstitutional under the U.S. Constitution's bar on cruel and
unusual punishment.8 The entire Simmons decision was based on the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Atkins v. Virginia,9 which
* J.D. Candidate, 2005, Fordham University School of Law. I would like to thank my
parents, Gail and John Marshall, for their inspiration, encouragement and insight
throughout this and every other project I have ever undertaken. Finally, thanks to
Michael Tarkan, my fiancd and best friend who has loved and supported me through
all my endeavors.
1. David L. Hudson Jr., Predictive Justice, 2 ABA J. eReport 36 (2003), available
at LEXIS, ABA Journals, ABA Journal eReport File.
2. Adam Ortiz, ABA Juvenile Justice Ctr., Overview of the Juvenile Death
Penalty Today (Spring 2003), at http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/j uvjus/jdpfactsheet02.pdf.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. State ex rel. Simmons v. Roper, 112 S.W.3d 397,400 (Mo. 2003).
6. Ortiz, supra note 2.
7. Simmons, 112 S.W.3d at 400.
8. Id. at 399-400.
9. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
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struck down the death penalty for mentally retarded offenders as
unconstitutional."l The Simmons decision was called "unusual"'" and
the Missouri court was criticized as acting on a "hunch" as to what the
United States Supreme Court would do. 12 On January 26, 2004 the
Court granted certiorari to the case which will be heard during the
Court's October 2004 term. 3
This Comment explores the reasoning employed in the Simmons
and Atkins decisions and evaluates their conclusions, ultimately
finding the Simmons holding to be correct despite the confusing
standard laid out by the Supreme Court in Atkins. Part I provides
some necessary background information regarding the United States
Supreme Court's jurisprudence as it pertains to the death penalty.
Part II of this Comment examines the Simmons decision in detail and
its reliance on the Atkins decision. Last, Part III argues that the
difficulties experienced by the Simmons court in applying the Atkins
decision lay in the Supreme Court's ambiguous standard for
determining the "evolving standard of decency." This part argues for
an inclusive standard, and concludes that under this standard
Simmons v. Roper was decided correctly.
I. THE DEATH PENALTY AND THE UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT
Commentators have noted that no matter how intensely politicians,
commentators and activists argue for or against the death penalty,
"[n]o other center of power in American society comes close to having
the influence over the continued use of the death penalty that is
wielded by a single justice of the Supreme Court."'4 Challenges to the
death penalty's constitutionality have been mounted virtually annually
since 1972.11 Before examining these challenges, it is instructive to
reflect on the Court's handling of the Eighth Amendment. 6
Part I.A. explores the key Eighth Amendment cases in order to put
the death penalty jurisprudence into context. Part I.B. summarizes
the Court's major death penalty cases, and, more specifically, those
death penalty cases in which particular groups of offenders were
excluded from capital punishment. Part I.C. examines recent
Supreme Court rejections of appeals by juvenile offenders who argued
that juvenile executions are unconstitutional.
10. Id.
11. See Hudson, supra note 1 (quoting Professor Donald J. Hall).
12. Id. (quoting Professor Thomas Baker).
13. Roper v. Simmons, 72 U.S.L.W. 3483 (U.S. Jan. 27, 2004) (No. 03-633).
14. Joseph A. Melusky & Keith A. Pesto, Cruel and Unusual Punishment: Rights
and Liberties Under the Law 68 (2003).
15. Michael A. Foley, Arbitrary and Capricious: The Supreme Court, the
Constitution, and the Death Penalty 62 (2003).
16. See infra notes 17-36 and accompanying text.
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A. Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence
The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution bars
cruel and unusual punishment. 7 The Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause had been interpreted "[f]rom its adoption until the early
twentieth century... in accordance with the original understanding of
the Framers as a prohibition on 'torturous or barbaric methods of
punishment.' '"18
In 1910, the Supreme Court considered Weems v. United States,9
which presented an opportunity for the Court to expand the scope of
the Clause."° Weems had been convicted of fraud and sentenced to
fifteen-years imprisonment under the Philippine Penal Code; he
challenged the conviction claiming that this sentence constituted
"cruel and unusual punishment."'" The Court agreed, and struck
down Weems's criminal sentence because it violated the Eighth
Amendment.2
Two important principles were established in Weems that have since
been adhered to in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.23 The first was
the view that the Amendment limited not only torture but "all
punishments which by their excessive length or severity are greatly
disproportioned to the offenses charged. '24 This principle opened the
door for the Court to strike down punishments which fell short of
torture but were not proportionate to the crime. The other influential
principle set forth in Weems concerned a battle between two manners
of deriving constitutional meaning: looking solely to the Framers
intent or by allowing meaning to be influenced by evolving societal
standards .2  The majority held that "cruel and unusual punishment"
was to be interpreted in a "progressive" manner, and "not fastened to
the obsolete but may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes
17. U.S. Const. amend. VIII.
18. Jeffrey Banks, In re Stanford. Do Evolving Standards of Decency Under
Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence Render Capital Punishment Inapposite for Juvenile
Offenders?, 48 S.D. L. Rev. 327,331 (2003) (citation omitted).
19. 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
20. See Weems, 217 U.S. at 367-73; Foley, supra note 15, at 24 (describing the
question before the Court as: "What is the nature, meaning, and scope of cruel and
unusual punishment clause?").
21. Weems, 217 U.S. at 357-60.
22. See Melusky & Pesto, supra note 14, at 87.
23. See Foley, supra note 15, at 24; see also Melusky, supra note 14, at 88; Edmund
P. Power, Too Young to Die: The Juvenile Death Penalty After Atkins v. Virginia, 15
Cap. Def. J. 93, 94-95 (2002).
24. Weems, 217 U.S. at 371 (internal quotations omitted).
25. Foley, supra note 15, at 24-28. Foley explains that interpretivists are only
willing to look to the meaning that the clause could have had when it was written,
while non-interpretivists are willing to look at a broad range of modern realities in
determining the meaning of the Constitution. Id. at 24. In describing the holding in
Weems, Foley concludes that the majority represented a non-interpretivist approach.
Id.
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enlightened by humane justice. '26 This manner of interpretation
allowed the phrase to evolve beyond what was likely envisaged in
1791, when it was written into the United States Constitution.27 The
Court explained that "[t]ime works changes, brings into existence new
conditions and purposes" and found that the clause "must be capable
of wider application than the mischief which gave it birth. ' 28 The
original enactment of the clause "constituted a response of the
Founding Fathers to the primitive crudity of the past."29 Since the
clause had originally intended to protect against torture, this
progressive interpretation meant that the clause could be read to
prohibit the excessive imprisonment in Weems's case. The Weems
Court did not, however, give any guidance as to how the evolving
standards were to be determined.
A progressively interpreted Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause
was central to another important Eighth Amendment case, Trop v.
Dulles.3" Trop has been very influential in Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence,31 and its language is often cited today.32 The Trop
Court cited Weems, and found that the meaning of the "cruel and
unusual punishment" clause was "not static" and that "[t]he
Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society,"33 further
expounding on the notion of a progressive interpretation. This idea of
evolving standards "may be the benchmark against which all
punishments are compared and evaluated."' The progressive
interpretation in Trop included the "standards of all 'civilized'
nations .... Thus in the Court exhibited a willingness to allow
international standards of decency to influence the meaning of cruel
and unusual punishment under the United States Constitution."3 The
Court clearly used international practice as part of its determination
but still did not set a clear test to guide future cases.
Neither of these cases were death penalty cases36 but they are
central to understanding modern Eighth Amendment challenges to
26. Weems, 217 U.S. at 378 (citations omitted); see also Foley, supra note 15, at 24.
27. See Foley, supra note 15, at 24-25.
28. Weems, 217 U.S. at 373.
29. Jan Gorecki, Capital Punishment: Criminal Law and Social Evolution 84
(1983).
30. 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (deciding that a loss of citizenship was a disproportionate
punishment under the Eighth Amendment for the crime of desertion which occurred
during a time of war).
31. See Foley, supra note 15, at 40.
32. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 304 (2002); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492
U.S. 361, 361 (1989); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 821 (1988).
33. Trop, 356 U.S. at 101.
34. See Foley, supra note 15, at 42.
35. Matthew C. Brewer, Constitutional Law: Broadening the Criteria for Defining
Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 55 Fla. L. Rev. 731, 733 (2003).
36. See supra notes 21, 30 and accompanying text.
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the death penalty. The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause has
been used to challenge the death penalty on many occasions.
B. The Constitutionality of the Death Penalty
In 1972, the Supreme Court heard three cases consolidated under
the name Furman v. Georgia that challenged the constitutionality of
the petitioners' death sentences.37 The statutes under which the
petitioners had been sentenced "enumerated many capital crimes but
provided no further guidance to the sentencing authority in deciding
whether to impose the death penalty."38 The petitioners argued that
these death sentences were handed down by a system of arbitrarily
applied capital punishment. Since 1947 the rate of execution had
dropped steadily due to a hesitation on the part of the courts and
increasingly aggressive appellate review.3 9 The abolitionist movement
in the United States "simmered through the first few decades of the
twentieth century, expanded in the 1930s, and became powerful in the
1950s and 1960s."4° The 1970s witnessed a reversal of the trend
towards abolition.41 The divisions among the Justices in Furman
clearly reflected society's atmosphere of confusion, hesitation and
division.42 The opinion of the Court, written per curiam, consisted of
only one paragraph and "unexpectedly"43 reversed the imposition of
capital punishment on these defendants, as these punishments
"constitute[d] cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments."" In the longest death penalty
decision the Supreme Court has ever issued each Justice wrote an
opinion, either concurring or dissenting, delineating all the major
arguments for and against capital punishment.45 Whereas Justices
Brennan and Marshall wrote that the punishment of death itself
37. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239 (1972).
38. Ashley Rupp, Note, Death Penalty Prosecutorial Charging Decisions and
County Budgetary Restrictions: Is the Death Penalty Arbitrarily Applied Based on
County Funding?, 71 Fordham L. Rev. 2735, 2740 (2003). The three petitioners were
all African-American; two had been convicted of rape and one of murder. Id. at 2741.
There was some question as to whether Furman, one of the petitioners, was actually
sane. Id. Another one of the petitioners had previously been found to be borderline
mentally retarded. Id.
39. Gorecki, supra note 29, at 92. This increasing review was "largely due to a
concerted action of abolitionist lawyers, especially those of the NAACP Legal
Defense and Education Fund" who appealed nearly every sentence. Id.
40. Id. at 87.
41. Id. at 95. This trend was partially due to the dramatic increase in crime,
among other factors. Id. at 97-113.
42. Id. at 112.
43. Welsh S. White, The Role of Social Sciences in Determining the
Constitutionality of Capital Punishment, in Capital Punishment in United States 3-23
(Hugo Adam Bedau & Chester M. Pierce eds., 1975).
44. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239-40 (1972).
45. See, e.g., id.; see also Foley, supra note 15, at 62.
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violated the Eighth Amendment,46 the other three Justices who joined
them in the majority concluded that the death penalty was unevenly
and arbitrarily applied and therefore unconstitutional.4
7  Of
importance, "all nine [J]ustices made use of empirical data" although
there were many disagreements regarding the "Court's role in
reviewing empirical data and the data's relevance to the
Constitutional issues. '48 The data regarding the arbitrary application
of capital punishment convinced some Justices that its application was
unconstitutional while other justices were unswayed.
In the four years after Furman, thirty-five states enacted new death
penalty laws hoping the Supreme Court would consider these laws
more favorably than those in Furman.49 These new laws "[made] clear
that capital punishment itself ha[d] not been rejected by the elected
representatives of the people."50  In the years prior to the
pronouncement that these new laws passed constitutional muster
there had been a "steep increase in punitive attitudes" in American
society.51
The statute under review in Gregg v. Georgia2 had "instituted
bifurcated trials, required a finding of statutory aggravators, and
required immediate appellate review for all capital cases."53  The
petitioner and a friend had picked up two hitchhikers and shot them,
but at trial had claimed they did so in self-defense.54 The jury had
convicted the pair and found that aggravating factors were present.55
46. Furman, 408 U.S. at 257-306, 314-371.
47. See id. at 257 (noting that the death penalty laws and procedures are
"pregnant with discrimination and discrimination is an ingredient not compatible with
the idea of equal protection of the laws that is implicit in the ban on 'cruel and
unusual' punishments" (Douglas, J., concurring)); id. at 309-10 ("These death
sentences are cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck by lightning is cruel
and unusual.... Petitioners are among a capriciously selected random handful upon
whom the sentence of death has in fact been imposed" (Stewart, J., concurring)); id.
at 313 ("[T]he death penalty is exacted with great infrequency ... and that there is no
meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which it is imposed from the many
cases in which it is not" (White, J., concurring)).
48. See White, supra note 43, at 4 (explaining that the concurring Justices all
agreed that the death penalty as applied was unconstitutional due to the jury
discretionary sentencing evidence before them).
49. See Melusky & Pesto, supra note 14, at 108.
50. Robin M.A. Weeks, Comparing Children to the Mentally Retarded: How the
Decision in Atkins v. Virginia Will Affect the Execution of Juvenile Offenders, 17
B.Y.U. J. Pub. L. 451, 454 (2003) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 180-91
(1976)).
51. See Gorecki, supra note 29, at 112.
52. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
53. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 166-68; Rupp, supra note 38, at 2744-45 (internal citations
omitted).
54. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 159-60.
55. Id. at 160 (internal citations omitted). The jury found that the murder had
been committed during the course of a felony and that it had been committed for
pecuniary gain. Id.
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Gregg was sentenced to death, and the new Georgia law under which
he was convicted received Supreme Court approval.
56
Justice Stewart wrote the judgment of the Court and an opinion on
behalf of himself and Justices Powell and Stevens.5 ' The opinion
stated that the "punishment of death [did] not invariably violate the
Constitution,' 58 although Stewart stated that the meaning of the cruel
and unusual clause was not static.59 Stewart stated that the Court
should be led by objective criteria in its determination of what the
public attitude is toward a particular punishment.6 ° Stewart further
stated that there were limits, and that "our cases... make clear that
public perceptions of standards of decency with respect to criminal
sanctions are not conclusive. 61  Thus, Stewart stated that the Court
itself must ensure that the punishment is not excessive, meaning that it
has a penal justification and is proportionate to the crime.62 Stewart
emphasized that the Court will not invalidate a punishment simply
because it has determined that a lesser one would suffice, so long as
the punishment is seen to serve its retributive and deterrent
purposes.63
Stewart began investigating the penal justifications for the death
penalty by recognizing the need of society to express its moral outrage
and found that death is sometimes seen as the only appropriate
response to a heinous crime.' Stewart also recognized the extreme
difficulty of deciphering the exact deterrent effect of the death
penalty,65 resigning himself to the conclusion that "there [was] no
convincing empirical evidence either supporting or refuting this
view.''66  Without convincing evidence to refute the Georgia
legislature's assumption that the penalty had a deterrent effect,
Stewart stated, the legislature would be presumed to be correct as to
that specific determination. 67 Finally, Stewart concluded that death
was not per se disproportionate. 68 This decision indicated that the
death penalty was not a per se violation of the Eighth Amendment.
However, subsequent cases still questioned the death penalty's
constitutional application to certain offenders.
56. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 153. Only the abolitionists, Justices Brennan and Marshall,
dissented. Id. at 157; see also Melusky & Pesto, supra note 14, at 108.
57. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 158.
58. Id. at 169.
59. Id. at 173.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 173, 183 (citing Furman, Weems and Trop).
63. Id. at 182-83.
64. Id. at 183-84.
65. Id. at 184-85.
66. Id. at 185.
67. Id. at 186-87.
68. Id. at 187.
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1. Categorical Exclusion
Since determining that death can be an appropriate penalty and is
not, itself, unconstitutional, the Court has gone on to exclude some
groups of offenders from the possibility of the death penalty. The
Court has excluded groups of defendants based on their mens rea or
actus reus, 69 but has also done so on the basis of their personal
characteristics. 70
a. Group Exclusion from the Death Penalty
The year after Gregg, the Court determined in Coker v. Georgia
that capital punishment was a disproportionate punishment for the
crime of rape of an adult woman. 71  The Court cited its own
independent evaluation of the punishment for support of this
conclusion, as well as the fact that Georgia was the only state at that
time that authorized capital punishment for this crime.72
The Court has also grouped defendants by their individual
characteristics. In Thompson v. Oklahoma, the Court considered the
constitutionality of capital punishment for those offenders who were
age fifteen or younger at the time of their crime.73 The Court, in a
four-one-four decision, reversed the petitioner's death sentence, 74 and
the case effectively banned executions for offenders under the age of
sixteen if the state had not set a minimum age limit.75
Justice Stevens, writing for himself and three other Justices who
wished to exclude these young offenders from death eligibility,
considered many factors in determining the current standard of
decency.76 Stevens pointed to other Oklahoma laws that excluded
youths from participating in certain activities, such as voting and
drinking alcohol, as evidence that the law regularly recognizes a
difference between children and adults.77 Although the opinion found
69. See Power, supra note 23, at 95.
70. Id.
71. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 600 (1977).
72. Id. at 595-96 (recognizing that other jurisdictions allow for death when the
victim of the rape was a child and the rapist an adult). The Court engaged in a state-
counting procedure while trying to determine the public's view of the appropriateness
of this punishment for rape. Id. at 596. This practice became very important in later
cases regarding the "evolving standards of decency" determinations. See infra PartsI.B.lb., I.B.l.c., 11.
73. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
74. Id.
75. Jeffery Fagan, Atkins, Adolescence, and the Maturity Heuristic: Rationales
for a Categorical Exemption for Juveniles from Capital Punishment, 33 N.M. L. Rev.
207, 233 (2003).
76. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 818-38.
77. Id. at 823-25. The Court introduced this inquiry by quoting Justice Powell's
dissenting opinion in Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 590-91 (1975). "[T]here are
differences which must be accommodated in determining the rights and duties of
2896 [Vol. 72
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that most state legislatures had not expressly set a minimum age for
the death penalty, Stevens did not interpret this to mean that there
was no consensus as to the minimum acceptable age for capital
punishment.7" He asserted that it was well accepted, and indeed not
disputed in this case, that "some offenders are simply too young to be
put to death."7 9 In determining that age, Stevens only looked to states
that had adopted the death penalty and had set a minimum age. 0 In
narrowing his inquiry to the states that had expressly addressed the
age issue in their statutes, Stevens found that each of those eighteen
states had set the minimum age at sixteen.8" Stevens identified further
support for his conclusion that executing sixteen-year-olds was not in
conformity with the current standards of decency, including the
opinions of various professional organizations,8 2 reluctance of juries to
impose such a sentence, 3 and current international practices. 4
After Justice Stevens' inquiry into the existing consensus, he
engaged in a proportionality analysis, calling into question the ability
of these executions to fulfill the dual penal goals. Stevens found the
goal of retribution in this case to be "inapplicable," owing to "the
lesser culpability of the juvenile offender, the teenager's capacity for
growth, and society's fiduciary obligations to its children. 8 6 Similarly,
Stevens found the deterrent effect on offenders of this age to be
suspect for two reasons. 7 First, it was highly unlikely that such an
offender would make a cost-benefit analysis before committing such a
crime.88 Second, even if these offenders were to make such a
calculation, they would not be deterred because such executions are
extremely rare.89 The opinion concluded that, since the practice failed
to contribute to goals of capital punishment, it was "'nothing more
than the purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering,'
children as compared with those of adults. Examples of this distinction abound in our
law .... Thompson, 487 U.S. at 823-25. Stevens also attached a lengthy appendix to
his opinion in which he tallied of state laws that exclude fifteen-year-olds from various
activities. Id. at 839-48.
78. Id. at 826-29.
79. Id. at 829.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 830.
83. Id. at 831-33.
84. Id. at 830-31. The prohibition was found to be "consistent with the views that
have been expressed by... other nations that share our Anglo-American heritage,
and by the leading members of the Western European community." Id. at 830.
85. Id. at 833-38.
86. Id. at 836-37. Earlier, to add force to this culpability assertion, Stevens cited
Supreme Court decisions in which the Court found that youth should have a special
mitigating force, and concluded that "the Court has already endorsed the proposition
that less culpability should attach to a crime committed by a juvenile than to a
comparable crime committed by an adult." Id. at 835.
87. Id. at 837.
88. Id.
89. Id.
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and thus an unconstitutional punishment."9 Because the punishment
was not serving a penal goal, Stevens found it to be in violation of the
Eighth Amendment.9'
Justice O'Connor left open the question of the absolute
unconstitutionality of these executions, although O'Connor did find
that in the petitioner's case, the death penalty should not be
imposed.92 O'Connor agreed that there is some age at which an
offender is too young for capital punishment, and that this age should
be determined by the evolving standards of decency.93 O'Connor
decided the case on "narrower grounds" 94 than the plurality, finding
the conviction unconstitutional because Oklahoma had set no
minimum age in its statute and thus had not carefully considered the
question.95 O'Connor left open the broader Eighth Amendment
question of the ultimate constitutionality of executing offenders under
the age of sixteen and agreed with the plurality in vacating the
sentence.96 In her concurrence, she stressed a desire to avoid
substituting her subjective opinion for the judgment of state
legislatures, which O'Connor felt had not fully addressed the issue.97
Pointing to the history of death penalty challenges, she found a
"danger in inferring a settled societal consensus from [sentencing]
statistics like those relied on in this case." 9  O'Connor was
uncomfortable coming to an absolute conclusion regarding the
constitutionality of these executions because few state legislatures had
fully considered the issue.99
90. Id. (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977)). Stevens also refused
to consider petitioner's argument that executing someone under eighteen years of age
was unconstitutional. Id. Stevens asserted that the Court could only decide the case
at bar, and that this case dealt solely with a fifteen-year-old. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 848-50 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
93. Id. at 848.
94. Id. at 849. Because O'Connor did not decide per se that fifteen years old was
too young for an offender to be executed, the case does not itself explicitly bar these
executions. But, as was stated earlier, this case has been interpreted to mean that
sixteen is the minimum age if the state has not yet expressly set one. See supra note
75.
95. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 857.
96. Id. at 858-59.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 854. While O'Connor recognized that there was no evidence of any
legislative body having carefully considered and approved the execution of fifteen-
year-olds, she thought that it was also a "real obstacle in the way of concluding that a
national consensus forbids this practice," that nineteen states and the federal
government have laws that made such executions possible. Id. at 852. However, she
disagreed with the weight the dissent placed on this fact, and acknowledged the need
to look to other evidence. She emphasized that the plurality's evidence regarding
execution and sentencing statistics "support[s] the inference of a national consensus
opposing the death penalty for [fifteen]-year-olds, but [it is] not dispositive." Id. at
853.
99. Id. at 852.
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Writing for the dissent, Justice Scalia expressed his disapproval of
the evidence used by the plurality to establish a national consensus
against the practice."0 Justice Scalia saw that a "risk of assessing
evolving standards is that it is all too easy to believe that evolution has
culminated in one's own views."'01 Looking back, Scalia commented
that in order "[t]o avoid this danger we have, when making such an
assessment in prior cases, looked for objective signs of how today's
society views a particular punishment. 10 2 Although the plurality
presented objective evidence, the dissent disapproved of using the
rarity of these executions as a justification for finding a national
consensus against the practice. 13 The dissent looked exclusively to
the legislation that addressed this issue as the real objective evidence
of current societal standards."° Scalia's opinion concluded that "a
majority of the States for which the issue exist[ed] (the rest d[id] not
have capital punishment) [were] of the view that death [was] not
different insofar as the age of juvenile criminal responsibility [was]
concerned.""1 5 Scalia did not count the non-death penalty states, he
merely counted the states that had the death penalty and had set a
minimum age.0 6 He therefore found no national consensus opposing
the practice, and no other reason to vacate the sentence.10 7
b. Refusing to Exclude: Penry and Stanford
One year after the Court decided Thompson, it issued two opinions
on June 26, 1989 that refused to exclude groups from capital
punishment based on the personal characteristics of the offenders. 108
In Penry v. Lynaugh, the Court rejected the contention that executing
mentally retarded offenders was prohibited under the Eighth
Amendment.109 The Court rejected the same contention with regard
to offenders under the age of eighteen in Stanford v. Kentucky. 10
In the first case, Johnny Paul Penry had been arrested and charged
with the murder and rape of Pamela Carpenter."' A clinical
psychologist had testified that Penry was mentally retarded and had
100. Id. at 864-65.
101. Id. at 865.
102. Id. (citations omitted).
103. Id. at 869-72.
104. Id. at 865-72.
105. Id. at 868. This disagreement between the majority and the plurality
concerning the appropriate way to count the states in order to discern a "national
consensus" is not one that ends with this case. See infra Parts I.B.1.b.-c.
106. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 868.
107. Id. at 877-78.
108. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361
(1989).
109. See Penry, 492 U.S. at 335.
110. See Stanford, 492 U.S. at 377.
111. Penry, 492 U.S. at 307.
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the mental age of a six-and-a-half-year-old child, and all the life skills
of a normal nine- or ten-year-old.1 Despite this testimony, a jury
found him competent to stand trial." 3 Later, having rejected his
insanity defense, the jury found him guilty of capital murder."4 On
appeal, Penry's counsel objected to the jury sentencing instructions,
and ultimately the Supreme Court agreed that "the absence of
instructions informing the jury that it could consider and give effect to
the mitigating evidence of Penry's mental retardation" did not allow
the jury to make a "'reasoned moral response' to that evidence in
rendering its sentencing decision."1 5 Because of this limitation on the
jury, his sentence was remanded.1 6
Penry was not so successful with his claim that mentally retarded
offenders should be categorically excluded from capital punishment
under the Eighth Amendment."7 In a fragmented decision, the Court
refused to prohibit the execution of these offenders.1 ' Justice
O'Connor wrote the opinion of the Court, which consisted of only two
parts: the history of the case and the decision that the holding would
apply retroactively.119 The dissenting Justices joined O'Connor's
analysis of cruel and unusual punishment and her decision that the
holding would not constitute a "new rule"'2 ° while Chief Justice
Rehnquist, and Justices White, Scalia and Kennedy (the plurality in
this case) joined her discussions of finality and "new rule"
retroactivity.12 1 No other Justice joined O'Connor's proportionality
analysis. 22
O'Connor's opinion found a total prohibition was unnecessary
because the modern insanity defense would exclude those persons
without any mental ability from the death penalty, while others would
be judged individually based on their degrees of mental ability.12 1 She
first examined the common law's prohibition against the punishment
of "idiots," which she determined to have been those persons who
"had a total lack of reason or understanding. 1 24 As to whether a
national consensus had emerged that disapproved of such executions,
the Court was not convinced. 125  Only two states prohibited the
practice at the time and "even when added to the [fourteen] States
112. Id. at 307-08.
113. Id. at 308.
114. Id. at 310.
115. Id. at 328 (internal citations omitted).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 335.
118. Id.; see also Weeks, supra note 50, at 466-68.
119. Penry, 492 U.S. at 307-13, 329-30.
120. Id. at 314-28, 350-51.
121. Id. at 313-14, 350-51.
122. Id. at 306, 335-40.
123. Id. at 333.
124. Id. at 331-32.
125. Id. at 333-35.
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that ha[d] rejected capital punishment completely, [they] d[id] not
provide sufficient evidence at [that time] ... of a national
consensus." 126 Therefore, O'Connor considered death penalty states
that banned the practice and states that had abolished the death
penalty altogether and found these sixteen states were still insufficient
for a finding of a national consensus. 127  This part of O'Connor's
opinion was not joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White,
Scalia and Kennedy, who similarly found there to be no national
consensus against the practice. 28 Their absence might be explained by
that "Part's analysis of opinion polls and the opinions of professional
organizations-evidence sources [those Justices] ... specifically
defined as irrelevant.' 1 29 In other words, those Justices might have
agreed with Justice O'Connor's finding that a national consensus had
not yet developed against the practice but the very consideration of
these extra indicia precluded their joining her opinion. 3 °
After stating that a consensus had not emerged against these
executions, O'Connor wrote to champion the importance of a
proportionality analysis. 3' She concluded that there were varying
degrees of mental retardation and that juries were allowed to consider
the defendant's reduced mental capacity as a mitigating factor, and
thus "it cannot be said on the record before us today that all mentally
retarded people, by definition, can never act with the level of
culpability associated with the death penalty.1132 No other Justice
joined O'Connor in this part because the dissenting Justices felt a
proportionality analysis revealed that the punishment was excessive,'33
while other Justices felt that a proportionality analysis was an
improper inquiry. 34
Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion engaged in a proportionality
analysis but concluded that the mental attributes of mentally retarded
offenders always made the death penalty disproportionate for these
offenders and was therefore unconstitutional.' While he recognized
that there were varying degrees of mental retardation, he concluded
that all persons who qualify as mentally retarded lack the culpability
126. Id. at 334. Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens found this
punishment unconstitutional because they found it was disproportionate. See infra
notes 131-35 and accompanying text.
127. Id. at 334.
128. Id. at 306.
129. Weeks, supra note 50, at 467.
130. See id.
131. Penry, 492 U.S at 336-40. O'Connor has consistently insisted on the
importance, and indeed indispensable nature of, a proportionality analysis in these
cases. See infra notes 164-66, 200 and accompanying text.
132. Penry, 492 U.S. at 338-39.
133. See infra notes 135-37 and accompanying text.
134. See supra note 122; infra notes 141-43 and accompanying text.
135. Penry, 492 U.S. at 346.
20041 2901
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
required for the "ultimate penalty."' 36  Even if there were some
mentally retarded offenders who had the capacity for such culpability,
Brennan was unconvinced that allowing the defendant's mental
capacity to serve as a mitigating factor would effectively ensure that
only those "exceptional" mentally retarded offenders would be
sentenced to death. 37
Further, Brennan found that the twin goals of punishment were not
served by this practice.138 First, because of a reduced culpability due
to diminished mental capacity, the need for the most severe
retribution was not present.'3 9 Second, as to the goal of deterrence,
because these offenders had a reduced capacity for decision making
and strategic thinking, they were unable to make the kind of reasoned
decisions that might include contemplation of the possibility of
execution. 4 °
Justice Scalia wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in
part to criticize O'Connor's insistence on a proportionality analysis.141
Scalia found that the punishment must both be "cruel and unusual,"
and that the only true way to determine what was unusual was to look
to the laws of the nation's legislatures and jury determinations. 142
Scalia concluded that if such an examination "fail[ed] to demonstrate
society's disapproval of it, the punishment [was] not unconstitutional
even if out of accord with the theories of penology favored by the
Justices of this Court. '143 Scalia found that in order for a punishment
to violate the Eighth Amendment a large portion of society must
disfavor it."44
The other death penalty decision handed down that day, Stanford v.
Kentucky, similarly refused to categorically exclude offenders from
the death penalty.'45 The case consolidated two appeals of offenders
who had been sixteen- and seventeen-years-old at the time of their
crimes; the Court granted certiorari to decide whether execution of
defendants under age eighteen was barred by the Eighth
Amendment. 146 Justice Scalia issued the plurality opinion joined by
136. Id.
137. Id. at 346-47.
138. Id. at 348-49.
139. Id. at 348.
140. Id. at 348-49. Justice Stevens agreed that the execution of such individuals is
unconstitutional, but wrote only to say that the practice should be ended for the
reasons given in the Brief for The American Association on Mental Retardation. Id.
at 350 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
141. Id. at 350-51.
142. Id. at 351 (citation omitted).
143. Id. (citation omitted).
144. Id. (finding that after the Court determines that a national consensus does not
exist, there is no need to go further).
145. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
146. Id. at 368; see also Weeks, supra note 50, at 461-66.
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Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and Kennedy. 147  While
Scalia recognized that the interpretation of the meaning of "cruel and
unusual" should be interpreted progressively, he denied there was a
need for the Court to use its own judgment. 48 Scalia asserted that this
determination need only be guided by the objective indicia of state
statutes and jury verdicts. 149 First, Justice Scalia looked to the statutes
enacted by state legislatures as indicative of the current standards of
decency. 5 ° Scalia's counting of the states, as in Thompson, 5' was
limited only to those states that had capital punishment. He counted
fifteen states that prohibited execution under the age of seventeen
and twelve states that prohibited its use for offenders under the age of
eighteen.'52 This was not a majority of the death penalty states, and
Scalia was unconvinced that a national consensus against the practice
existed.'53 The opinion reviewed the other cases in which the death
penalty had been struck down, and pointed out that in those cases
there were far fewer states that still had the punishment than in the
case at bar. In other words, the number of states disapproving of the
practice had been much higher.
5 4
Scalia then turned to the evidence that the petitioners presented
regarding the reluctance of juries to impose and prosecutors to seek
such a sentence.' 5 This did not convince him that a standard of
decency was nationally accepted, as he pointed out that fewer capital
crimes were committed by this subsection of the population.'56
Further, Scalia saw the rarity of the juvenile death penalty as evidence
not that society believed it should never be imposed but that society
believed the death penalty should rarely be imposed.'57 The special
circumstances of individual offenders were dealt with in these cases by
147. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 364.
148. Id. at 369-70.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 370-73.
151. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
152. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 572.
153. Id. at 372-73. Scalia saw the petitioners as having to overcome a strong
presumption in these types of cases, as "[i]t [was] not the burden of Kentucky and
Missouri [the respondents in this case] ... to establish a national consensus approving
what their citizens have voted to do; rather, it [was] the 'heavy burden' of petitioners
to establish a national consensus against it." Id. at 373 (internal citation omitted).
154. Id. at 371. He goes on to assert that this case is more closely analogous to
Tison than Coker, Enmund or other precedent. According to Scalia, in Tison, only
eleven out of all the jurisdictions forbade the punishment at issue in that case. Id. at
371-72. In the other cases, such as Coker, the jurisdictions authorizing the
punishment were far fewer than the jurisdictions in question in Stanford which
authorized the juvenile death penalty. Id. In those cases only a handful of states, from
one to eight, inflicted the punishment. Id. at 370-71; see also supra notes 71-72 and
accompanying text. It remains to be seen if Scalia would be convinced of a national
consensus with anything less than the benchmarks set out in cases like Coker.
155. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 373.
156. Id. at 373-74.
157. Id. at 374.
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the constitutionally required consideration of age as a mitigating
factor, and Scalia saw this as adequate protection.158 Scalia next
"scoffed" '159 at the use of other indicia such as the international view of
the practice, opinions of professional groups and opinion polls."6
Scalia's dissent also restated that an independent evaluation by the
Justices of whether penal goals were served was nothing more than a
"cast[ing] loose from the historical moorings consisting of the original
application of the Eighth Amendment" and a thin veil by which the
Justices hid their mission to impose their own "preferences." '61 Scalia
acknowledged the existence of a proportionality analysis in some past
cases, but explained that it had never been dispositive and had always
also included a finding that state laws or jury determinations indicated
society's disapproval.162 Scalia asserted that the two methodologies,
proportionality analysis and evolving standards, were in fact
intertwined in that the former may only be conducted on the basis of
the latter.63
O'Connor again wrote a concurring opinion which defended the
need for a proportionality analysis. 6 Even though the opinion
pushed for this analysis, and went so far as to say that the Court had a
"constitutional obligation to conduct proportionality analysis,"165
O'Connor did not conclude that the punishments were
disproportionate to the crimes.166 In fact, the opinion did not delve
into the analysis except to point out disagreement with the plurality
that the analysis was irrelevant, and simply directed the reader to
O'Connor's proportionality analysis in Thompson.167  Influencing
O'Connor's opinion, as in Thompson, was the number of state
legislatures that had forbidden the practice, an indicator she found to
be "the most salient statistic."' "68  Unlike Thompson, however,
O'Connor found that a majority of states that allowed capital
punishment permitted the execution of offenders over sixteen, and
thus concluded that a national consensus had not yet developed
158. Id. at 374-77.
159. Weeks, supra note 50, at 462.
160. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 377.
161. Id. at 379. For a discussion of the this view as an "empty constitutional
standard," see infra Part III.
162. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 379-80. It is not clear that O'Connor or any of the other
Justices who promote the use of a proportionality analysis actually do advocate its use
without also finding some consensus based on state laws. See supra note 131; infra
Part II. The disagreement may really be more about the number of states needed for
a finding of a consensus, and the use of other types of indicia. See infra Part III.
163. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 380.
164. Id. at 381.
165. Id. at 382.
166. Id. at 380-82.
167. Id. at 382.
168. Id. at 381-82 (quoting Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 849 (1988)
(O'Connor, J.)).
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against the practice. 69 She anticipated that there might come a time
when such a consensus would have developed and would be indicated
by a "general legislative rejection of the execution of [sixteen-] or
[seventeen]-year-old capital murderers," but simply did not believe
that that time had come yet.170
Justice Brennan, writing for the dissent, also criticized Scalia's
plurality opinion for looking solely to legislative enactments and jury
sentences, and emphasized that while this analysis was a proper one to
conduct, it was by no means complete.' Brennan asserted that
Eighth Amendment inquiries must look also to whether the
punishment exceeds the offender's culpability and whether it serves a
"legitimate penal goal."'72 His dissent differed from the plurality not
only in the indicia it used, but also in its method of tallying the current
state laws that allowed the execution of seventeen- and eighteen-year-
olds. 173
Brennan refused to count the states that had not set a minimum age
for the death penalty as approving of juvenile execution because those
states had not yet considered the issue carefully. 74 Brennan did count
those states which had abolished the death penalty altogether as
opposing the juvenile death penalty, and thus concluded that "27
States refuse to authorize a sentence of death in the circumstances of
[seventeen-year-old] petitioner Stanford's case, and 30 would not
permit [sixteen-year-old] Wilkins' execution."'7 Further, the nineteen
states that had not addressed the issue were neutral to the discussion,
and only a few remaining jurisdictions explicitly allowed such
executions.176 The dissent also found evidence of a national consensus
against the practice in the rarity with which juries impose the
sentence, pointing out that the practice was truly an unusual one.177
Next the dissent presented the opinions of many well-respected
organizations which had publicly denounced the practice and pointed
169. Id. at 382. Here O'Connor joins Scalia in her counting method, choosing not
to count those states that had rejected the death penalty entirely as having implicitly
rejected the juvenile death penalty. Id. at 381.
170. Id. at 381-82.
171. Id. at 383.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 384-85.
174. Id. at 385.
175. Id.
176. Id. This difference between the majority and dissent regarding the counting of
states is an issue in later cases as well.
177. Id. at 386-87. In pointing these statistics out, the dissent also rejects the
majority's claim that this is merely evidence that the juries think that this should be a
rare practice, not that it should be abolished. Id. at 374. The dissent points out that
this argument was made in Coker, where Georgia argued that juries were reserving
the punishment for only the most extreme cases of rape. Id. at 387. The Court
rejected that argument and noted "simply that in the vast majority of cases, Georgia
juries had not imposed the death sentence for rape." Id.
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out that the practice was "overwhelmingly disapproved" of
internationally. 1
78
The dissent's proportionality analysis followed, and while Brennan
recognized that the plurality did not see it as relevant, the dissent
argued for its relevance by stating that the very nature of the Bill of
Rights was to remove some possibilities from the hands of the political
majority. 179  Allowing state legislatures to determine what is
constitutionally permissible amounted, for the dissent, to handing
back to the "very majorities the Framers distrusted the power to
define the precise scope of protection afforded by the Bill of Rights,
rather than bringing its own judgment to bear on that question, after
complete analysis.""18  In search of this "complete analysis," the
dissent determined that given the utmost severity of the death penalty
this punishment was disproportionate for juvenile offenders.'81
Brennan asserted that juveniles lacked the mental capacity of older
offenders, and thus were less culpable. 8 2 This negated the retributive
penal function of the death penalty, in that it disqualified them from
the ultimate punishment of death.183 Further, the deterrent goal was
not served because juveniles did not often consider the repercussions
of their actions as they were "prone to 'experiment, risk-taking, and
bravado"' and "lack[ed] 'experience, perspective, and judgment. ' '' 1,4
The dissent also highlighted the insufficiencies of merely leaving to
juries the task of sorting out the most culpable juveniles, and
demonstrated how that system failed in the individual cases of the two
petitioners.'85
Stanford demonstrates the disagreements among the various
Justices regarding the necessity of a proportionality analysis and the
method by which states' laws should be counted. It further highlights
the disagreement over whether opinion polls and professional
organizations should be considered when judging the evolving
standards. However, "[i]n a patent rejection of the Trop approach,
the Court... refused to consider international opinion in determining
whether the execution of a seventeen-year-old was
unconstitutional."'86 These cases make it clear that the Justices placed
weight on state legislative enactments and jury determinations, but
confusion remained regarding the other indicia that are to be properly
considered.
178. Id. at 389-90.
179. Id. at 391-92 (quoting from W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638
(1943)). For further discussion of Scalia's standard as an empty one, see infra Part III.
180. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 392.
181. Id. at 394-405.
182. Id. at 396-97, 403.
183. Id. at 397, 403.
184. Id. at 395 (internal citations omitted).
185. Id. at 398-403.
186. Brewer, supra note 35, at 733.
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c. Overturning Penry
Thirteen years after the Court decided Penry and Stanford, it
overruled its decision that the execution of mentally retarded adults
was not barred by the Constitution."8 The decision in Atkins v.
Virginia hinged on whether the standards of decency had evolved
since this question had last come before the Court in Penry.188 The
majority went through the history of Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence, concluding that punishments are to be proportionate
and in accord with the dignity of man.189 They also found that inquiry
into whether a punishment was excessive should be guided by
objective standards; the indicia need not be unanimous but weighted
heavily on one side. 9' The Court found many states had enacted
legislation banning the practice since the decision in Penry, and held
that "[m]uch has changed since then."'' The majority was quick to
point out that it was not the number of the states they found
compelling, "but the consistency of the direction of change."'"
Interestingly, in a footnote, the majority contrasted the changes that
occurred following Penry to those after Stanford saying that,
"[a]lthough we decided Stanford on the same day as Penry, apparently
only two state legislatures have raised the threshold age for imposition
of the death penalty.' ' 93
The majority did find that the reaction of states and their change in
legislation was overwhelmingly indicative of an evolution of the
standards of decency. 194 It cited the decision in Penry, which found
that two states banning the practice was insufficient for a finding of
national consensus, and compared that finding to the case before them
in Atkins in which nineteen states in total had abolished the death
penalty for the mentally retarded.1 95 Stevens, writing for the majority,
also cited one state in which the bill passed the legislature but was
vetoed by the governor, and two additional states in which the bill
passed one house. 96 Last, they pointed out that the states that passed
such bills did so with overwhelming majorities of their state
187. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). Although the Court did not expressly
overrule its reasoning in Penry, it did overrule the holding. Id. at 306-07. This case
also represented a major departure for the Court from its previous Eighth
Amendment holdings. See infra Part III.B.3.
188. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 311-17.
189. See id. at 311-12. Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and
Breyer composed the majority. Id. at 305.
190. Id. at 312.
191. Id. at 314.
192. Id. at 315.
193. Id. at 315 n.18. For further comparison of the two groups, see infra Parts II-
III.
194. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 314-16.
195. Id. at 314-15.
196. Id. at 315 n.16.
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legislatures, and that no states reinstated such executions. 197 Even
more convincing to the majority was that this type of legislation
(protecting the rights of criminal offenders) was generally unpopular
and further, in the states which allowed it, the practice was very
rare. 198 In this opinion, however, the majority limited its mention of
the opinions of professional organizations, religions, and the
international community to a footnote, though it did point out that
these groups overwhelmingly rejected executions of mentally retarded
offenders. 99
Stevens went on to fuse the "evolving standards" analysis with the
"proportionality" analysis, as he stated that the national consensus
against the practice was indicative of the public's recognition that
mentally retarded offenders had a reduced culpability and therefore
that these executions did not contribute to the twin penal goals.200
The majority bolstered the consensus found in the state laws with a
proportionality analysis spelling out the other factors they suggested
should be considered beyond mere state counting. Stevens wrote that,
given the clinical definition of mental retardation, which includes
severe mental deficiencies and lack of many other key life skills, there
was serious doubt as to whether the goals of retribution and
deterrence were served.20 ' Stevens explained that retribution of the
most extreme sort was not appropriate for these offenders given their
lessened culpability, as they were less able to learn from mistakes,
process information, and control impulses.2 2 In addition, the limited
mental capacity of these offenders made the likelihood that they could
make reasoned decisions, which took into account the possibility of
execution, highly unlikely.2 3
Stevens further asserted that the procedural protections which
normally guard against wrongful execution did not work as well in the
case of mentally retarded offenders. 20 4 The opinion concluded that
this risk called for a categorical exclusion of these offenders as it was a
grave one.2 5 The danger was real because of the possibility of false
confessions, the offenders' reduced ability to make a persuasive
showing of mitigating factors, their inability to adequately assist their
counsel or to testify as strong witnesses, and their disability being read
as a lack of remorse.2 6 Merely allowing mental retardation to serve as
197. Id. at 315-16.
198. Id. at 315 n.16, 316.
199. Id. at 316-17 n.21; cf supra notes 82, 178.
200. Id. at 317-21.
201. Id. at 318-20.
202. Id. at 318.
203. Id. at 319-20. This is also a problem in the case of youthful offenders. See infra
note 306 and accompanying text; Part II1.D.5.
204. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320-21.
205. Id.
206. Id.
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a mitigating factor had proven, Stevens stated, "a two-edged sword"
because it was often used against the defendant as an aggravating
factor by prosecutors who suggested that it indicated future
dangerousness. 27 He therefore concluded that "such punishment is
excessive and that the Constitution places a substantive restriction on
the State's power to take the life of a mentally retarded offender. 28
The dissents, written by Scalia and Rehnquist, echoed earlier
complaints regarding what factors should direct the analysis of current
standards of decency.2 9  Rehnquist specifically emphasized his
disapproval of the use of international law, organizations' stances, and
opinion polls, asserting that these were not objective factors and
arguing that the clearest evidence was state legislature enactments.1 0
This sentiment was reiterated in Scalia's opinion, in which he
expressed his perception that the majority used these factors to
parade their own personal beliefs as a newly evolved standard.2
Scalia also argued that this decision was not one that the courts are
equipped to handle and was more appropriately made by the
popularly elected legislative bodies. 12 Scalia not only counted the
states' laws differently (finding eighteen death penalty states
forbidding these executions instead of the majority's twenty-one), but
disapproved of the idea that the bills' popularity was indicative of the
standard of decency and pointed out that all of these laws were in
their infancy.213 He dismissed the "consistency-of-the-direction-of-
the-change" argument and warned against relying on such "trends."2 4
Scalia addressed the proportionality analysis by arguing that the
Eighth Amendment did not forbid excessive punishments. 15 Scalia
asserted that judges and juries were capable of properly accounting
for the mental handicaps of offenders, and that the deterrent effect on
individual offenders was irrelevant. 216  Relying on his tally, Scalia
concluded that with less than half (47%) of the death penalty states
forbidding mentally retarded offenders' executions, there was no
national consensus and thus no need to overturn Penry.1 7
207. Id. at 321.
208. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
209. Id. at 321-54.
210. Id. at 321-28.
211. Id. at 337-54.
212. Id. at 342-44.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 345 (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation omitted).
215. Id. at 349 (referring to his opinion in Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 966-
90 (1991)).
216. Id. at 348-52.
217. Id. at 343-44, 354.
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d. Overturning Stanford?: Attempts to Get Before the Court After
Atkins
After Atkins, advocates saw a chance to reverse Stanford as well,
and they filed petitions on behalf of juvenile offenders on death row
seeking reversal of their death sentences in light of the Atkins
decision.218  On August 28, 2002, the Court denied Toronto
Patterson's petition for stay of execution. 19 Patterson, seventeen-
years-old at the time of his crime, argued that his execution would
constitute a violation of the Eighth Amendment.22° Although the
majority did not explain its denial of the stay, Justices Stevens,
Ginsburg and Breyer wrote to express their desire to hear the case.22'
Writing the dissenting statement, Justice Stevens cited Justice
Brennan's dissent in Stanford, claiming that the reasoning in that
decision was correct at that time, and was even more compelling when
one considered the situation in 2002.2 Since the Stanford decision,
Stevens wrote, the "issue ha[d] been the subject of further debate and
discussion both in this country and in other civilized nations. 223
"Given the apparent consensus" against the practice, Stevens
suggested it was time for the Court to reconsider the issue in
Stanford.224 Ginsburg also wrote to voice her approval of Stevens'
reasoning and to express her special desire to reconsider the juvenile
death penalty in light of the Court's recent decision in Atkins.225
On October 21, 2002, the Court rejected another petition requesting
that it stay an execution on the grounds that juvenile executions are
unconstitutional. 26 This case, however, was more peculiar (and
perhaps more compelling for the dissent) in that the petitioner was
Kevin Stanford himself, one of the original offenders against whom
the Court had found thirteen years earlier.227 This case prompted the
same justices to dissent as in Patterson, but they were joined by Justice
Breyer, making the decision not to stay the execution five to four.228
Again the majority was silent as to its reasoning, and again the dissent
highlighted the similarities between juvenile executions and
executions of mentally retarded offenders, which they had recently
struck down in Atkins.229 Stevens, again writing for the dissent, argued
218. See, e.g., Patterson v. Texas, 536 U.S. 984 (2002); In re Stanford, 537 U.S. 968
(2002).
219. Patterson, 536 U.S. at 984-85 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
220. Brief for the Petitioner at 4-18, Patterson (No. 02-617).
221. Patterson, 536 U.S. at 984-85 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
222. Id. at 984.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 985 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
226. In re Stanford, 537 U.S. 968 (2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
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that the justifications laid out in Atkins apply with equal force to
juveniles, with one exception: The number of states banning juvenile
executions was two less than those banning executions of mentally
retarded offenders.23 He did not find this discrepancy to be
dispositive and went on to highlight the states that have abolished the
practice, either by law or Supreme Court ruling. 3 Stevens then
quoted extensively from Justice Brennan's proportionality analysis in
his dissent in the first Stanford, which accentuated the differences in
legal treatment juveniles receive because the law considered them less
mentally capable or mature than eighteen-year-old citizens.232 Stevens
then added that recent neuro-scientific evidence had bolstered this
assumption of incapacity.233 He concluded with an argument that a
national consensus had developed against these executions.2 4  He
pointed out that no state had lowered its eligibility age to sixteen or
seventeen since the first Stanford decision, and in fact, some states had
raised their minimum ages.235 Stevens found the attention being paid
to these offenders amazing, due to their small numbers (2% of the
total population of death row). 236 Finally, he presented opinion polls
in which a majority of Americans claimed to disapprove of the
juvenile death penalty as an additional indication of a national
consensus against the practice. 37
As seen in the history presented in Part I, the Court has struck
down the executions of mentally retarded adults,238 but-until the
Simmons case discussed infra-had refused to review its decisions on
juvenile executions. 239  After reviewing the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence regarding the Eighth Amendment and its application to
the death penalty, Part II explores the Missouri state case in which the
Missouri Supreme Court agreed to strike down the juvenile death
penalty by deciding it was unconstitutional under the federal
constitution.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 969.
232. Id. at 969-71. The quoted passages include an examination of the culpability of
these offenders, concluding that "juveniles so generally lack the degree of
responsibility for their crimes that is a predicate for the constitutional imposition of
the death penalty that the Eighth Amendment forbids that they receive that
punishment." Id. at 969 (quoting Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 394-96 (1989)
(Brennan, J., dissenting)). Stevens goes on to quote Brennan's listing of all the
activities which society has deemed juveniles too young to engage in because of their
lack of maturity. Id. at 970.
233. Id. at 971.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 969, 972.
236. Id. at 972.
237. Id.
238. See supra notes 187-217 and accompanying text.
239. See supra notes 226-37 and accompanying text.
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II. SIMMONS V. ROPER
This part examines in detail the Missouri case of Christopher
Simmons which challenged the constitutionality of the juvenile death
penalty. The events of September 8, 1993, as recounted by the
Missouri Supreme Court in its first opinion regarding his case, present
a gruesome picture of Christopher Simmons. 40 Simmons planned the
robbery and murder with his friends, thinking that his age would allow
him to "get away with it."' 241 Simmons and his accomplice broke into
his victim's home, bound her hands and feet and pushed her off a
nearby bridge.2 2  He was convicted of first-degree murder and
sentenced to death.243 Simmons appealed on the grounds, among
others, that his Fifth Amendment rights had been violated, and his
case was eventually heard by the Missouri Supreme Court.2 The
court rejected this first appeal, finding that his confession was
properly obtained and admitted into evidence, 245 and denying his
other allegations of rights violations. 46
On his second appeal to the Missouri Supreme Court, Simmons
argued that the execution of those offenders under eighteen years of
age violated the Eighth Amendment's bar on cruel and unusual
punishment.247 At first, the court explained, Simmons did not make
this argument because Stanford clearly held that these executions
were constitutional.2 48 He made this argument on the second appeal
because of the recent decision in Atkins v. Virginia, and wished to
apply the reasoning in that case to his own.249 The court agreed that a
national consensus had developed against these executions since
Stanford, just as the U.S. Supreme Court had found a consensus
against the executions in Atkins. 2 0 The court concluded that the U.S.
Supreme Court "would today hold [that] such executions are
prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. '251
The Missouri Supreme Court then went on to explain that it would
lift the reasoning in Atkins and apply it to juvenile executions.2  The
first hurdle in this exercise was determining whether a finding of
240. See State v. Simmons, 944 S.W.2d 165, 169-71 (Mo. 1997). This recitation of
the facts is also referred to in Simmons's second appeal to the Missouri Supreme
Court. See Simmons v. Roper, 112 S.W.3d 397, 399 n.1 (Mo. 2003).
241. Simmons, 944 S.W.2d at 169 (internal quotation omitted).
242. Id. at 170.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 172-76.
246. Id. at 177-91.
247. Simmons v. Roper, 112 S.W.3d 397, 399 (Mo. 2003).
248. Id.; see also supra notes 145-63 and accompanying text.
249. Simmons, 112 S.W.3d at 399; see also supra notes 187-208 and accompanying
text.
250. Simmons, 112 S.W.3d at 399.
251. Id. at 400.
252. Id. at 407.
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unconstitutionality would really have any effect on the defendant
because he did not raise this objection to the sentence at trial.23 The
court found that the existence of a national consensus against the
practice would place a "substantive restriction on the State's power to
take [a] life" 254 and thus would apply retroactively to the defendant,255
and, similarly, waiver rules would not apply.256
After having established the procedural aspects of its decision, the
majority went on to argue for the existence of a national consensus
against the practice.27 The opinion started by tracing the history of
the Eighth Amendment and its progressive interpretation as it applied
to the juvenile and mentally retarded death penalties.25 s Exploring
Thompson, Stanford, Penry, and Atkins, the majority isolated factors
that had been used in those cases to determine the existence a
national consensus regarding the practice in question, or lack
thereof.259 While the majority acknowledged the importance that
legislative enactments played in these determinations, it also
emphasized the recognition these cases gave to other factors.260 The
decision traced the use of data regarding the frequency of the
imposition of the penalty, opinions of professional and religious
groups, international practice, and the Court's own independent
analysis. 61
The majority concluded its background inquiries with a close look
at Atkins, in which it emphasized Atkins resemblance to Thompson
and not Stanford.262 The Missouri court divided the decision in Atkins
into four parts.263 First, the court said, the Supreme Court looked to
the legislative action that had been taken since Penry.2 4 The Missouri
court strongly emphasized the language in Atkins which stressed the
importance of the "consistency of the direction of the change, '"265 in
other words, that the number of states which had abolished the
practice was not as telling as the fact that no state had reestablished
the practice 6.2 6 The Simmons majority next noted Atkins' comment
253. Id. at 400.
254. Id. (citing Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (quoting Ford v.
Wainwright 477 U.S. 399, 405 (1986))).
255. Id. (citing Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989)).
256. Id. at 400-01 (citing Teague as establishing that such a finding would "deprive
the state of the power to impose the punishment of death on such a person").
257. Id. at 401-13.
258. Id. at 401-06.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 404-06.
262. Id. at 404.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 405 (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 315 (2002)) (emphasis
omitted).
266. Id.
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that the practice had become unusual even in those states whose laws
still allowed it.267 Third, the Missouri court explained that the Atkins
Court found further support for its finding of a consensus against the
practice in the opinions of national groups and international
practices.26 ' Finally, the Simmons court quoted from Atkins'
proportionality analysis.269
The Simmons court then began its analysis of the juvenile death
penalty using the principles it had derived from the Supreme Court
cases it discussed.27 ' First, it addressed its ability to even consider the
constitutionality of these executions, given that the current Supreme
Court precedent on the matter was clear.27 1 The court concluded that
it was not bound by Stanford because the Eighth Amendment is to be
progressively interpreted, and thus, the court found it was obligated to
reevaluate the state of the national consensus based on the current
national conditions.2 2 The majority stated that "[t]his [c]ourt clearly
has the authority and obligation to determine the case before it based
on current - 2003 -standards of decency. '273  The court based this
authority on passages from Justice Ginsburg's dissent from denial of
petition for writ in Patterson v. Texas,274 which argued for the validity
of reconsideration of Stanford based on the recent decision in
Atkins.75
The Missouri court built its analysis of the constitutionality of the
juvenile death penalty on the same principles that guided the Atkins
approach.76 It drew four indicia from Atkins to guide its current
inquiry into the existence of a national consensus:
(1) the extent of legislative action against or in favor of the juvenile
death penalty; (2) the frequency of the imposition of the death
267. Id.
268. Id. at 405-06.
269. Id. at 406.
270. Id. Part III of the decision was entitled, "Application of the Principles Set Out
in Atkins, Thompson, Penry and Stanford to the Execution of Juveniles Today." Id.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 406-07.
273. Id. at 407.
274. Id.; see supra notes 219-25 and accompanying text. The Missouri court also
quoted from Justice Stevens' dissent from the denial of petition for writ of habeas
corpus in In re Stanford, which argued for reconsideration of the juvenile death
penalty based on new scientific evidence regarding adolescent brain development.
537 U.S. 968, 968-72 (2002); see supra note 233 and accompanying text. The Missouri
majority acknowledged its dissenting justices' argument that the fact that these cases
were denied certiorari might imply that the Supreme Court would not in fact apply
the Atkins approach in the way the majority suggested. Simmons, 112 S.W.3d at 407
n.6. The majority responded that denial of certiorari has been clearly established to
hold "no implication whatsoever regarding the Court's views on the merits of the case
which it has declined to review." Id. (quoting Maryland. v. Balt. Radio Show, 338 U.S.
912, 919 (1950)). For a discussion of whether this argument adequately supports the
Missouri court's authority to review Stanford see infra note 313.
275. Simmons, 112 S.W.3d at 407.
276. Id.
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penalty on juveniles in modern times, and the frequency with which
it is carried out even when imposed; (3) national and international
opinion on the juvenile death penalty; and (4) an independent
examination of whether the death penalty for juveniles violates
evolving standards of decency and so is barred by the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments.
77
The court began its inquiry with an examination of the current
legislative status of the juvenile death penalty, and how it has changed
since Stanford.278 While the court admitted that the change in state
legislation since 1989 (the year both Stanford and Penry were
decided) is not as dramatic as the one the Supreme Court noted in
Atkins, it did not find it any less compelling.279 In Atkins, the Supreme
Court relied on the consensus having grown from the two states that
barred execution of the mentally retarded in 1989 to the eighteen
states that expressly forbade the practice in 2002.280 The Missouri
court noted that in the case of juveniles the change in number is not as
dramatic, but is equal in consistency. 8 While only five states had
effectively raised their minimum age for death penalty eligibility since
1989, the Simmons court argued that there had been less progress to
be made because in 1989 eleven states already banned the practice.282
This argument came as a response to footnote eighteen of Atkins
which expressly distinguished the two circumstances because far fewer
states had changed their laws regarding juveniles than regarding the
mentally retarded since 1989.283 The Missouri court responded:
It would be the ultimate in irony if the very fact that the
inappropriateness of the death penalty for juveniles was broadly
recognized sooner than it was recognized for the mentally retarded
were to become a reason to continue the execution of juveniles now
that the execution of the mentally retarded has been barred.2 4
277. Id. For further discussion of the structure of the inquiry and whether it can
truly be said to be directly drawn from the Atkins decision see infra Part III.
278. Simmons, 112 S.W.3d at 407-09.
279. Id. at 407-08.
280. Id.; see also supra notes 194-99 and accompanying text.
281. Simmons, 112 S.W.3d at 407-09. In neither case have states reinstated the
practice. Id. at 408.
282. Id. at 408 & n.10. Indiana and Montana legislatively raised their minimum age
for execution to eighteen; Kansas and New York reinstated their death penalties in
this time period but only for those eighteen or older; Washington State abolished its
juvenile death penalty in a state supreme court decision. Id. at 408 nn.7-9.
283. Id. at 408 n.10.
284. Id. For further discussion of this response to Atkins's distinction between the
two situations, see infra Part III. In Edmund Power's article for the Capital Defense
Journal, he points out that this footnote in Atkins only mentioned that two states had
raised their minimum ages, while in fact three other states had effectively done so
either by reinstating capital punishment only for adults, or by abolishing the practice
by court decision. See Power, supra note 23, at 101. He concludes this point by
asserting that, "in 1988, the country was closer to a national consensus against the
juvenile death penalty than it was to one against the execution of the mentally
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The Missouri court also noted, as did the Atkins Court, that these
legislative changes have occurred in a climate in which "law and
order" legislation is far more popular than those laws that attempt to
protect the rights of offenders .28  Later the court also pointed out
that, given the rarity with which these executions occur, it is amazing
that they received legislative attention at all-again a point that was
also made in Atkins.286 Concluding this first of the four prongs of its
analysis, the court emphasized the consistency of the change and
offered the fact that many states were currently considering legislation
that would abolish the practice as evidence of the trend continuing.287
The Missouri court examined the infrequency with which juveniles
were actually subjected to this punishment. 288 It justified this inquiry
by asserting that the Atkins Court found this evidence "persuasive. "289
The court emphasized the rarity of these executions, noting that of the
twenty-two states which theoretically allow such executions, only six
have actually carried any out since Stanford.2 ° Further, of the 366
executions of this type carried out since 1642 only twenty-two of these
had taken place in the modern era of the death penalty (1973-2003).291
The court concluded by comparing Atkins to the case at bar, citing the
fact that "more mentally retarded persons than juveniles have been
executed, in more states, since the death penalty was reinstated in
1976. "292
Moving on to its third inquiry, the Simmons court listed the various
professional, social, and religious organizations that had come out in
opposition to the practice of juvenile executions.293 It separately listed
those organizations which had done so since Stanford,294 and those
which had filed briefs amicus curiae in Stanford.95 In addition, the
court listed those religious organizations that had announced their
disapproval of the death penalty itself.296 It also mentioned that only a
retarded"; thus, he finds this less dramatic shift to be sufficient for a finding of a
current national consensus against the practice. Id.
285. Simmons, 112 S.W.3d at 408. For Atkins's similar point see supra note 198 and
accompanying text.
286. Simmons, 112 S.W.3d at 410.
287. Id. at 408-09.
288. Id. at 409-10.
289. Id. at 409.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id. at 410.
293. Id. at 410-11.
294. Id. at 410 (citing The American Psychiatric Association, The American
Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, The National Mental Health
Association, The National Center for Youth Law, The Coalition for Juvenile Justice,
The American Humane Association, and The Constitution Project).
295. Id. at 410 n.16.
296. Id. at 410-11.
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clear minority of Missourians support the death penalty for
juveniles.297
While the court recognized that Stanford had little use for these
types of indicia, the court claimed to follow Atkins' "shift back to
reliance on such evidence to confirm the national consensus that
evolving standards of decency proscribe imposition of the death
penalty on the mentally retarded. '298 While the court did not rely
exclusively on such evidence, it did assert that it found the opinions of
these groups, and of the international community, to be consistent
with the legislative movement.299
The court's last inquiry was an independent analysis of the
appropriateness of this punishment specifically for juveniles."' 0 It
arrived at the same conclusion as the Atkins Court, that neither of the
twin goals of punishment was served by these executions.30 1 The court
cited the United States Supreme Court in Thompson, as having
recognized the diminished mental capacity of juveniles.3 2 It also
quoted extensively from Thompson to support its argument that
youth, far from being merely a "chronological fact, 30 3 has far reaching
implications which make these offenders more susceptible to outside
pressure and more likely to act without full understanding of their
actions.3 4 These facts of youth mean that these offenders act with a
diminished culpability, and thus, the goal of retribution is not served
by their execution.30 5  Second, the court found that the goal of
deterrence is not served because these offenders have a reduced
capacity to make reasoned decisions in which the possibility of
execution might weigh, and even if it did, these executions are so
infrequent that their weight would be slight.36  Last, the court
examined the risk of wrongful execution as the Atkins Court did and
arrived at the same conclusion: that there is an increased risk with
this group of offenders. 307 The court submitted that these offenders,
297. Id. at 411.
298. Id. For further discussion regarding the reliance of the Supreme Court of the
United States on such evidence see infra Part III and accompanying text.
299. Simmons, 112 S.W.3d at 411.
300. Id. at 411-13.
301. Id.; see also supra notes 201-03 and accompanying text.
302. Simmons, 112 S.W.3d at 412; see also supra notes 85-86 and accompanying
text. Perhaps more current and relevant research could have been used to bolster the
argument that these offenders operate with a diminished capacity for decision
making. For further discussion on this point, see infra Part III.D.5.
303. Simmons, 112 S.W.3d at 412 (quoting Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815,
834 (1988)).
304. Id.
305. Id. Although the court noted that the defendant in the case at bar was
seventeen-years-old and not fifteen, as was the case in Thompson, it found that the
reasoning still applies because he is still an adolescent. Id.
306. Id. at 413. The court again found support for its argument against the
deterrent effect in Thompson. Id.
307. Id.; see also supra notes 204-08 and accompanying text.
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"who have had less time to develop ties to the community, less time to
perform mitigating good works, and less time to develop a stable work
history" are more likely to be wrongfully sentenced to capital
punishment.308 Further, these offenders are more likely to waive
important rights and to give false confessions.30 9
The court held that youth as a mitigating factor alone has proven
insufficient protection from wrongful executions, and that, in fact, this
factor is often aggravating.310 The court cited Simmons's particular
case in which the prosecutor told the jury in closing arguments that if
they allowed Simmons's age to protect him from the death penalty
then they were letting Simmons "win."31' The court then quoted from
the rest of the prosecutor's argument in which he told the jury to:
"Think about age. Seventeen years old. Isn't that scary. Doesn't that
scare you? Mitigating? Quite the contrary I submit. Quite the
contrary."312
The Missouri court concluded that the United States Supreme
Court, given its recent decision in Atkins, would hold that juvenile
executions violate the Eighth Amendment because the standards of
decency have evolved to the point where the practice is no longer
acceptable.313
The state appealed the decision of the Missouri Supreme Court, and
the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in late January
2004.314 Since four Justices have already voiced their opinion that the
practice of juvenile executions should end, it is unclear whether a fifth
will join them when the case is decided. In fact, "the impetus to take
up the issue this time may well have come from the [C]ourt's more
conservative members." '315 The outcome of this case remains to be
seen, but Roper v. Simmons presents an opportunity for the Court to
adopt and explain a more inclusive inquiry for determining the
current standards of decency.
308. Simmons, 112 S.W.3d at 413.
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. Id. (internal quotations omitted)
312. Id.
313. Id. The concurrence in this case suggested that if these executions were not
barred completely, perhaps a presumption of ineligibility for execution could be put
in place to protect juveniles, and the state would have to rebut that presumption with
evidence that the particular offender was exceptionally mature for his age. Id. at 415-
18 (Wolff, J., concurring). The dissent objected to the holding on the grounds that the
Missouri Supreme Court had no authority to overturn United States Supreme Court
precedent. Id. at 418-21 (Price, J., dissenting). The dissent pointed out that Stanford
was the precedent, and that its holding was clear on this issue and whether or not the
majority agreed with the reasoning in that case, it was constrained constitutionally to
follow it. Id. at 420. The dissent was unmoved by the petitioner's argument that the
Supreme Court "implicitly" overruled Stanford when it decided Atkins. Id. at 419-21.
314. Roper v. Simmons, 72 U.S.L.W. 3483 (U.S. Jan. 27, 2004) (No. 03-633).
315. Linda Greenhouse, Court to Review Using Execution in Juvenile Cases, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 27, 2004, at Al.
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Part III provides recommendations for adoption of an inclusive
standard for determining "evolving standards of decency" when the
case is decided by the Court.
III. CALL FOR A MORE INCLUSIVE TEST
Determining the constitutionality of a punishment should require
more than a mere tallying of state laws. The inquiry the Court uses as
its guide should look beyond the state counting and consider other
indicia that are just as indicative of the standards of decency as state
legislative actions. While the Supreme Court has discussed other
factors in its cases, it has yet to fully flesh out an inclusive standard.
The Roper v. Simmons case is an opportunity for the Court to
specifically discuss a broad range of indicia and their role in Eighth
Amendment tests.
Atkins was a major departure from previous death penalty
challenges in the Supreme Court, although the decision did not appear
as such. While the majority presented its decision as following the
well-established "national consensus" standard, the Court in fact
relied on a proportionality analysis, strengthened by some other
indicia. Accordingly, the Missouri court in Simmons recognized the
changes established in Atkins for an Eighth Amendment challenge of
the death penalty, and attempted to apply these benchmarks to the
juvenile death penalty.
Specifically, the Missouri court's difficulties in applying Atkins were
present because the Atkins majority hid its shift towards a more
inclusive view of "consensus" behind the traditional method of state
counting. The Supreme Court majority in the Atkins decision
mentioned factors other than state legislative action, and conducted a
proportionality analysis, but claimed that these factors were merely
supplemental and served to bolster the national consensus that was
found in the state laws.
At first glance, the Missouri court in Simmons appears to have
over-emphasized the importance of certain factors in the Atkins
decision. In fact, the Missouri court cut through the veil that the
Atkins majority constructed around its true motivations coming to the
conclusion that the Atkins decision seems to dictate: that the
execution of juveniles violates the Eighth Amendment. This decision
flowed from its finding that the practice was opposed by many states,
it was an internationally condemned practice, its abolition was called
for by the American public and by national organizations, and
because it was a disproportionate punishment. These are all
legitimate reasons for finding a practice unconstitutional and it is time
for the Supreme Court to abandon the notion that tallying states is
determinative in Eighth Amendment interpretation.
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A. Atkins Represented a Departure from Previous Eighth Amendment
Death Penalty Decisions
Although the Atkins decision employed the established "national
consensus" test, the decision represented a major departure from
previous Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. Atkins has been called
"an [a]nomaly. 31 6  Atkins marks a reformation of the objective
criteria needed to establish the existence of a national consensus.317
This redefinition flows from the fact that "the objective indicia of a
'national consensus' relied upon by the court was nowhere near the
previous benchmark required to find a sentencing practice
unconstitutional." '318 Atkins provided an idea of the number of state
laws needed to form a "national consensus." The decision found that a
national consensus had developed based on the fact that 47% of death
penalty states rejected the practice.31 9 Previously, the Court had
refused to find such a consensus when 42% of death penalty states
banned the punishment in question.32 ° Although the Court has never
announced a specific number which it considered to be crucial,32" ' it
seems unlikely that the difference of five percent was dispositive for
the majority in Atkins, especially when one considers that this group
of states did not represent a majority of the death penalty states.322
The majority also added the states that specifically banned juvenile
316. Mark Allen Ozimek, Note, The Case for a More Workable Standard in Death
Penalty Jurisprudence: Atkins v. Virginia and Categorical Exemptions Under the
Imprudent "Evolving Standards of Decency" Doctrine, 34 U. Tol. L. Rev. 651, 681
(2003).
317. Jamie Hughes, For Mice or Men or Children? Will the Expansion of the Eighth
Amendment in Atkins v. Virginia Force the Supreme Court to Re-Examine the
Minimum Age for the Death Penalty?, 93 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 973, 1007 (2003).
318. Id. at 1007-08.
319. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 342 (2002).
320. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 370-71 (1989). It is also interesting to
compare Atkins to other cases in which there was a finding of a national consensus
against a certain punishment such as those discussed supra Part I.B.l.c. Mark Ozimek
points out that it is
worthwhile to note that in Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 408 (1986), the
Court ruled that it was unconstitutional to execute the legally insane when
no death penalty State permitted such an execution and in Enmund v.
Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797 (1982), the Court ruled that it was unconstitutional
to execute an accomplice to robbery whose co-conspirator took a life when
only eight death penalty States permitted it.
Ozimek, supra note 316, at 682 n.332.
321. See supra Part I.
322. See Ozimek, supra note 316, at 681-82 ("Surely, the Atkins Court could not
have believed that there was magic in the increase from 42% to 47% .... [T]his
anomaly in death penalty jurisprudence has emerged because of the 'evolving
standards of decency' doctrine."). Ozimek suggests that a more workable standard
could be achieved if the analysis rested solely on a finding that a majority of death
penalty states had banned the practice and had sustained that ban for a "sufficient
duration." Id. at 682. Interestingly, this reformation by the Atkins Court is hardly
mentioned by the Simmons court, although it seems to be the most compelling
argument for the reversal of an aspect of Stanford.
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executions to those that ban all executions.323 The same equation was
used by the dissent in Stanford, with similar results.324 The majority in
Stanford rejected this calculation, and "the Court's reliance on this
number in Atkins redefines 'national consensus' within Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence. 3 5 The Atkins majority attempted to
explain its departure by stating that "[i]t is not so much the number of
these States that is significant, but the consistency of the direction of
change.326 Justice Scalia, in his dissenting opinion in Atkins, calls this
'consistency' justification an attempt "to bolster [the majority's]
embarrassingly feeble evidence of 'consensus. "'327
A more plausible explanation of the majority's finding of a
consensus rests in the inclusion of other factors by the Court in the
Atkins decision. For example, as the Missouri court asserted, Atkins
"clearly demonstrated a shift back to reliance on [the opposition of
social, professional, and religious groups] to confirm the national
consensus."328 The Atkins Court also looked to the legislative
majorities by which the laws banning these executions passed, the
number of states that had come very close to passing such laws, and
other indicia. The Supreme Court in Atkins "not only enlarge[d] the
class of evidence deemed acceptable for determining societal values, it
also increase[d] the weight afforded that evidence. 3 29 The Court's
decision in Atkins drew its conclusions from a broad base of indicia,
although it paid lip service to the traditional state counting method.
B. A More Inclusive Standard
These supplemental factors are constitutionally permissible sources
of the evolving standards of decency, and the independent
proportionality analysis is constitutionally required. These factors are
not only permissible indicia, but also serve a desirable goal: to rest a
constitutional determination on a complete examination of a variety
of factors affecting the issue.330
In Atkins, Justice Stevens acknowledged the Court's acceptance
323. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 314-15.
324. Hughes, supra note 317, at 1003 (citing Atkins as concluding that sixty-one
percent of jurisdictions would not allow the executions in question, and the Stanford
dissent asserting that sixty percent would not allow juvenile executions).
325. Id.
326. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 315.
327. Id. at 344.
328. Simmons v. Roper, 112 S.W.3d 397, 411 (Mo. 2003); see also Hughes, supra
note 317, at 1006 (stating that in Atkins "the Court has re-established a precedent of
looking to outside sources such as opinion polls, statements of professional and
religious organizations and the international community in its consensus debate").
329. Brewer, supra note 35, at 740.
330. But see id. at 739-40 (arguing that the precedent set by Atkins is a dangerous
one because it could lead the Court to respond too quickly to short-term changes and
make it difficult for state legislatures to determine if their laws fit within this more
inclusive constitutional standard).
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that objective evidence was not to be wholly determinative.331 Stevens
quoted from the Court's decision in Coker in which the Court noted
that "the Constitution contemplate[d] that in the end our own
judgment [would] be brought to bear on the question of the
acceptability of the death penalty under the Eighth Amendment." '332
Stevens further pointed to Enmund v. Florida, in which the Court
examined the State legislature's judgments and found "no reason to
disagree with that judgment for purposes of construing and applying
the Eighth Amendment." '333 This quote suggests that even if a state
consensus existed, the Court would not be bound by that consensus.
While the Eighth Amendment may not require that legislatures
choose to impose the least burdensome punishment, it does require
that punishments "should be graduated and proportioned to [the]
offense." '334 The Court has read the "text of the Amendment to
prohibit all excessive punishments, as well as cruel and unusual
punishments that may or may not be excessive." '335 This reading
requires a determination of whether or not the punishment is
proportionate to the crime, a determination which should be judged
by the standards that "currently prevail." '336 The majority in Atkins
stated that they will first look to the objective indicia provided by the
states to determine what standards exist, but then look to whether the
Court has a reason to agree or disagree. However, the Atkins
majority strained to fit the evidence provided by the state laws into
their "national consensus" benchmarks in order to present the other
indicia the majority lists as merely supplemental.337 While the Court's
evaluation of the prevailing standards should be directed as much as
possible by the objective indicia, the state laws are not the only factors
which the Court may look to beyond their own judgment. Besides the
objective criteria available, the Court is constitutionally bound to
conduct a proportionality analysis employing the Justices' own
personal assessment of the culpability of the offenders.33
1. State Legislatures as an Inaccurate View
The actions of state legislatures are not dispositive and may even be
a faulty indicator of the national climate. Even the majority in Atkins,
indirectly, spoke to the difficulties in relying solely on state
legislatures in order to determine the nation's standards of decency.
331. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312 (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977)).
332. Id.
333. Id. at 313 (quoting Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782,801 (1982)).
334. Id. at 311 (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910))
(alteration in original).
335. Id. at 311 n.7.
336. Id. at 311.
337. See supra Part I.B.1.c.
338. See infra notes 353-56 and accompanying text.
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Justice Stevens noted that bills abolishing the death penalty for
mentally retarded offenders faced difficulties in the state
legislatures.339 Stevens explained that the popularity of anticrime
legislation and the low popular interest in offender's rights legislation
posed great obstacles for these bills.34° Stevens also emphasized that
the infrequency with which these offenders are actually executed
posed another obstacle to the attention these bills gain, as "there
[was] little need to pursue legislation barring the execution of the
mentally retarded. '341 Given these obstacles, the passage of these bills
provided "powerful evidence" of a national consensus.34 2 By noting
these difficulties, Justice Stevens implicitly recognized that there are
many pressures at play in state legislatures that prevent them from
purely reflecting the moral judgments of the majority of their
constituents. Certainly for the states that have not executed a juvenile
in years, undertaking the burdensome process of passing a bill may
seem unnecessary for an issue that has essentially become moot.
Further complicating the clarity of this evaluation is the
disagreement regarding the proper way to count these states.43 As
previously mentioned, the majority in Atkins counted the states that
had explicitly passed laws excluding the mentally retarded from
capital punishment, and those states which had abolished the death
penalty all together. In previous cases, only the states where the
death penalty was still in place had been counted because the states
without the death penalty were regarded as not having directly
considered the question.3' The Simmons court asserted that five
states had abolished their juvenile death penalty since the Stanford
decision, however, one of these states (Washington) 345 abolished the
practice by court decision. There might be a dispute as to how to
count this state because the legislature would not have considered the
issue, as the issue had become moot. It has even been suggested that
the combined populations of the states that have rejected the practice
could be considered.346 Certainly these disputes complicate objectivity
and clarity of the state counting.
339. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 315-16 (2002).
340. Id.
341. Id. at 316.
342. Id.
343. See Banks, supra note 18, at 355 (stating "there is disagreement on how state
legislation should be analyzed").
344. See id. (stating "[t]he question was whether the mentally retarded should be
subject to the death penalty, not whether the death penalty in all forms should be
prohibited").
345. See Washington v. Furman, 858 P.2d 1092 (1993).
346. Sarah Cardwell, Atkins v. Virginia: "[I]n the End Our Own Judgment Will Be
Brought to Bear..., " 55 Baylor L. Rev. 829, 854 (2003).
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2. The Court Has the Power to Turn Away from State Tallying
The state counting test was judicially constructed and can be
amended to be more inclusive. In Trop, which established the
evolving standards of decency test, Chief Justice Warren recognized
the legitimacy of looking to the practices of other nations in
determining the constitutional validity of a punishment.347 The
"evolving standards of decency" did not even become "firmly
ensconced in death penalty jurisprudence until the late 1980's. ''341
Although Stanford 49 and Penry35 ° avoided considering factors beyond
the state legislative shifts and jury sentencing practices, the Court may
look to past cases such as Trop which did consider additional factors.
The Court has the power to modify the reliance on state counting and
expand on the inclusive indicia it considered in Atkins.
3. An Empty Standard
By looking solely to the number of states in determining what is
constitutionally permissible, the Court is advancing an empty
standard. While other death penalty cases have employed broader
standards, Stanford was "based heavily on procedural dimensions,"
leaving the jurisprudence in this area void of "substantive
considerations about the capacities or blameworthiness of
juveniles. ' 351' The Atkins decision offers an alternative approach, a
more inclusive inquiry that "places primacy on substantive
considerations of reduced culpability, capacity, and understanding. 352
The nature of the Eighth Amendment, the underlying concept of
which is "nothing less than the dignity of man," '353 demands a more
substantive standard. The aim of the Eighth Amendment was to
prohibit states from imposing certain punishments and to assure that
the states' power to punish is "exercised within the limits of civilized
standards.""3 4  Without an independent analysis by an independent
body, exclusive reliance on state counting leads to an "empty
constitutional standard," as it effectively "hands back to the very
majorities the Framers distrusted the power to define the precise
347. Ozimek, supra note 316, at 661 (quoting Chief Justice Warren in Trop as
recognizing "[t]he civilized nations of the world are in virtual unanimity that
statelessness is not to be imposed as punishment for crime" (citation omitted)).
348. Id.
349. See supra notes 159-63 and accompanying text.
350. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
351. Fagan, supra note 75, at 234.
352. Id.
353. Banks, supra note 18, at 327 (citing Trop v. Dulles, 326 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958)).
354. Id. (citing Trop, 326 U.S. at 100-01).
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scope of protection afforded by the Bill of Rights. 3 55 If the Eighth
Amendment was meant to bar some punishments no matter what
their popularity, then further analysis is necessary beyond a mere tally
of states that approve or reject a particular sentencing practice.356
D. Under an Inclusive Standard Juvenile Executions Are
Constitutionally Forbidden
Under a standard that includes looking to factors such as the
frequency of the practice, the international scope of the practice, the
opinions of professional groups and opinion polls, the special risk of
wrongful execution and a proportionality analysis, Simmons was
decided correctly by the Missouri court.357 Although the state
legislative count does not represent an overwhelming majority,358
355. See Joseph W. Goodman, Overturning Stanford v. Kentucky: Lee Boyd Malvo
and the Execution of Juvenile Offenders, 2 Mich. St.-DCL L. Rev. 389, 395 (2003)
(quoting Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 391-92 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
356. Id. at 396.
357. Before addressing the accuracy with which the Missouri court applied Atkins
one must first look to whether it had the power to do so. One point that detracts from
the force of the Simmons decision is the questionable nature of the court's authority
to decide the question. In fact, the state raised this issue after having lost in the
Missouri Supreme Court in its petition for writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme
Court. The first question the state posed in light of the Missouri Supreme Court's
holding in Simmons was: "[o]nce this court holds that a particular punishment is not
'cruel and unusual' and thus barred by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, can
a lower court reach a contrary decision based on its own analysis of evolving
standards?" Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Simmons v. Roper, 112 S.W.3d 397
(Mo. 2003), cert. granted, 72 U.S.L.W. 3483 (U.S. Jan. 24, 2004) (No. 03-633). The
majority based its authority on the principle that the Eighth Amendment should be
interpreted progressively, and thus, "this determination must be made based on the
state of law and standards that existed when Stanford was decided in 1989, and that to
do otherwise is to overrule Stanford, is simply incorrect." Simmons v. Roper, 112
S.W.3d 397, 407 (Mo. 2003) (citing Justice Ginsburg's dissent from denial of petition
for writ in Patterson v. Texas, 536 U.S. 984, 985 (2002)). The majority further cited to
Justice Stevens's dissent from denial of petition for writ in In re Stanford, 537 U.S. 968
(2002). The dissent in Simmons pointed out that the Missouri justices are bound by
Supreme Court rulings as the "supreme law of the land" and claimed that in this case,
the governing precedent is Stanford. Simmons, 112 S.W.3d at 420. Although the
majority did not explicitly state that it believed Atkins overturned Stanford implicitly,
it must subscribe to this rationale to some extent. In its summary of the case's history,
the court explained that petitioner did not raise an Eighth Amendment claim in his
first appeal because Stanford was binding case law at that time. However, after the
decision in Atkins the petitioner asked the court to review his sentence in light of that
decision. Id. at 399. The Missouri court could have held that juvenile executions
violated the Missouri State Constitution as its Article I, Section 21 is exactly the same
as the federal Eighth Amendment. Compare Mo. Const. art. I, § 21, with U.S. Const.
amend. VIII. The court, in fact, noted that the petitioner had made an alternative
argument for relief based on the Missouri Constitution's bar on cruel and unusual
punishment, but did not see it necessary to address this argument because the Eighth
Amendment afforded him relief. Simmons, 112 S.W.3d at 413.
358. However, the court in Simmons called attention to the large number of states
which have been considering legislation raising the age for execution. Simmons, 112
S.W.3d at 408-09. In five states, the legislation has partially passed the state
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many more factors indicate that the standards of decency have
evolved to a point where juvenile executions are no longer acceptable.
1. Infrequency of Practice
In the past, the Supreme Court has accepted the infrequency with
which the punishment is actually carried out as one of the objective
factors that may direct the inquiry into the prevailing standards of
decency.5 9 As the court in Simmons pointed out, the practice of
juvenile executions has become "truly unusual" in the United
States.3" Since 1973, only seven states have actually carried out such
an execution, although nineteen still allow the practice.361 Juveniles
account for only two percent of death row inmates.362 This evidence
of infrequency is similar to that present in Atkins.363
2. International Opposition
The Missouri court correctly delineated the international opposition
to the execution of juveniles.3" On October 9, 2003, the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights found that the United States
was in violation of an international law norm when it executed
Napoleon Beazley, a juvenile offender .3  The Commission found that
"by persisting in the practice of executing offenders under age
eighteen the U.S. stands alone amongst traditional developed world
nations.., and has also become increasingly isolated within the entire
global community. 36 6 This lends force to the need to consider the
legislature, and in an additional nine states it has been introduced. See Fact Sheet:
The Juvenile Death Penalty, at www.ncadp.org/juvenile-fact-sheet.html (last visited
Mar. 21, 2004); see also Juvenile Death Penalty: Resources and General Information,
at www.abanet.org/crimjust/juvjus/resources (last visited Mar. 21, 2004). Most
recently, South Dakota and Wyoming raised their minimum ages to eighteen, while in
New Hampshire, a similar bill was presented in the state legislature. Press Release,
National Coalition to Abolish the Death Penalty (Mar. 3, 2004), at
http://www.ncadp.org/press release-3-3-2004_juveniles.html.
359. See supra notes 35, 199 and accompanying text.
360. Simmons, 112 S.W.3d at 405.
361. Victor Streib, Adolescence, Mental Retardation, and the Death Penalty: The
Siren Call of Atkins v. Virginia, 33 N.M. L. Rev. 183, 199 (2003) (noting also that
Texas has been the only state to carry one out since 2000). Since Professor Streib's
article, two states have raised their minimum ages. See supra note 358.
362. Streib, supra note 361, at 199; see also Hughes, supra note 317, at 1005-06. But
see Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). In his dissent in Atkins, Justice Scalia
asserts that the rarity of executions is not a compelling argument for their abolition,
but rather an indication that the use of mental retardation as a mitigating factor is
relegating such sentences to only extreme cases. Id. at 346-47.
363. Id. at 316.
364. See Simmons, 112 S.W.3d at 410-11.
365. Report No.53/03, Case 12.412, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
(Oct. 2003).
366. Id. 48. The Commission went on to find the United States in violation of an
international norm and the American Declaration; they recommended that the
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opinion of the world community on this issue.367 In comparison to
Atkins, "[t]he international consensus on the juvenile issue is at least
as strong as on the mental retardation issue, and more explicit in
international treaty law. 3 68 Although some object to the use of the
international opinion,3 69 "[t]he view of the world community is both an
additional objective demonstration of civilized standard and
something that should influence the justices' own judgment in asking
whether there is reason to disagree with the judgment reached by the
citizenry and its legislators. '"370  Courts recognized the use of
international practice as early as Trop, and it remains an important
indicator of societal norms.
3. Opinions of National Groups and Citizen Polls
The Simmons opinion followed the shift in Atkins back to emphasis
on the opinions of professional, social and religious groups.37 1 Groups
who oppose the execution of juveniles are similar to those that Atkins
identified as opposing the execution of mentally retarded offenders.3
The juvenile death penalty "was opposed by an enormous number of
such organizations when Stanford was decided, and that number has
continued to grow" and "opposition to the death penalty for juvenile
offenders can be found in nearly every organized religion in the
world." '37 3 It is notable that the American Law Institute included a
prohibition of this practice in the Model Penal Code, commenting that
"civilized societies will not tolerate the spectacle of the execution of
children." 374
Similarly, evidence of the American public's opinion of the practice
United States offer the victim's next of kin an effective remedy and make necessary
changes to its laws and procedures to ensure no further violations. Id. [ 54-56.
367. For further discussion of the international law aspect of this debate, see
Richard Wilson, International Law Issues in Death Penalty Defense, 31 Hofstra L.
Rev. 1195 (2003); Amnesty Int'l, The Exclusion of Child Offenders from the Death
Penalty Under General International Law, at
http://web.amnesty.org/library/ENGACT500042003 (last visited Sept. 16, 2003).
368. Hughes, supra note 317, at 1006 (quoting Amnesty Int'l., Indecent and
Internationally Illegally: The Death Penalty Against Child Offenders 5 (Sept. 2002)).
369. See supra notes 210-11 and accompanying text.
370. Goodman, supra note 355, at 398 ("[Iin fact, since 2000, the United States is
the only country in the world that is known to have executed juvenile offenders."
(internal quotations omitted)).
371. See Simmons v. Roper, 112 S.W.3d 397,411 (Mo. 2003); see also Hughes, supra
note 317, at 1006.
372. Compare Simmons, 112 S.W.3d at 410 (citing the condemnation of the practice
by the American Psychiatric Association and various religious organizations including
Christian and Jewish groups), with Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316 n.21 (citing the American
Psychological Association and Christian and Jewish organizations).
373. Streib, supra note 361, at 200; see also Power, supra note 23, at 106-07.
374. Power, supra note 23, at 106.
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shows overwhelming disapproval.3 75  In one recent American poll,
sixty-nine percent of respondents opposed the juvenile death
penalty.376
4. Risk of Wrongful Execution
Both Atkins and Simmons discuss the possibility that their
respective group of offenders will not be adequately protected by the
normal procedural safeguards.377  As with mentally retarded
offenders, "[t]hese 'disturbing' false confessions also frequently occur
with juvenile suspects. 378  Aggravating these risks is the fact that
"aggressive police tactics during interrogations of adolescents often
produce confessions that later prove false. 3 79  Juveniles have also
been shown to frequently waive their constitutional rights,380 and
"[b]ecause of their underdeveloped thought processes and
immaturity, they are less likely to understand their rights." '381 The
Supreme Court has long recognized this vulnerability. 382
5. Proportionality Analysis
To some extent the proportionality analysis in both Atkins and
Simmons turns on the examination of the offenders' mental capacity.
This aspect is important because it has implications on both the
offenders' culpability and their ability to be deterred. In Simmons,
the court based its analogies between Atkins and juveniles on
information from the decisions in Thompson and Stanford.38 3 New
studies have shown that the teenage mind is much less developed than
previously thought, and much more susceptible to impulse.384 Some
375. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316 n.21; Gallup Poll, Crime (May 6-9, 2002), available
at http://www.pollingreport.com/crime.htm.
376. Hughes, supra note 317, at 1007; see also Streib, supra note 361, at 200 (noting
that support for these executions has been low for a long time, receiving anywhere
from 21% to 26% approval from Americans from 1936-2002).
377. See supra notes 204-06, 301-03 and accompanying text.
378. Power, supra note 23, at 113 (pointing to the false confessions of Johnny Ross,
a sixteen-year-old, and Mario Hayes, a seventeen-year-old).
379. Fagan, supra note 75, at 245 (citing the case autopsies for Professors
Tanenhaus and Drizin). See generally id. at 243-46.
380. See Power, supra note 23, at 112.
381. Fagan, supra note 351, at 243.
382. Id. at 243-44 (citing Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962); Haley v. Ohio,
332 U.S. 596 (1948)).
383. Simmons v. Roper, 112 S.W.3d 397, 401-03 (Mo. 2003).
384. Elizabeth R. Sowell et al., Mapping Continued Brain Growth and Gray Matter
Density Reduction in Dorsal Frontal Cortex: Inverse Relationships During
Postadolescent Brain Maturation, J. of Neuroscience, Nov. 15, 2001, at 8819-29; see
also Fagan, supra note 75, at 235 nn.156-57 (citing Elizabeth S. Scott & Lawrence
Steinberg, Blaming Youth, 81 Tex. L. Rev. 799, 800 (2002); Elizabeth S. Scott et al.,
Evaluating Adolescent Decision Making in Legal Contexts, 19 Law & Hum. Behav.
221, 229-35 (1995); Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth Cauffman, Maturity of Judgment
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Supreme Court Justices recently took notice of this new vein of
research.385 Jeffery Fagan, a professor of law and public health at
Columbia University, wrote that the "most critical difference between
adolescents and adults ... is that teenagers are less competent
decision makers than adults."386  In Professor Fagan's paper
examining the constitutionality of the juvenile death penalty, he
surveys many of these new studies.387 Fagan cites magnetic resonance
imaging ("MRI") studies that map brain development in which
researchers have concluded that "brain maturation is not complete
until about age twenty-one." '388 The brain areas that these young
people have yet to fully develop help control impulses and aid in the
consideration of alternatives and consequences.3 9  These are
developments that Professor Fagan concludes "make people morally
culpable."390 This reduced culpability makes the goal of retribution
less applicable to this class of offenders. Additionally, social context
studies show this age group to be particularly susceptible to peer
pressure and impulse.3 91 After surveying the scientific evidence and
social context studies, Fagan concludes that these "developmental
influences.., undermine decision-making in ways that are generally
accepted as mitigating of culpability."392 These characteristics are
"functions of age rather than characteristics of individual juveniles,
and these limitations should make juveniles less culpable, as a class,
than adults."3 93 The inability of juveniles to be trusted with decisions
is reflected in our laws forbidding that they smoke, make contracts
and vote.3 94 The law even forbids these young people from serving on
the very juries such as those convicting them. 395 Because this class of
offenders has been found to have a diminished mental capacity, the
twin penal goals are not served by their executions.
Further, these studies that show the immaturity of offenders
highlight another consideration to be taken into account regarding the
juvenile death penalty. Not only are these offenders less culpable and
less likely to be deterred, but they may have a greater capacity for
reform than their older counterparts given that these limitations are a
in Adolescent Decision Making, 20 Law & Hum. Behav. 249 (1996)); Power, supra
note 23, at 107-09; Streib, supra note 361, at 202.
385. See supra note 233 and accompanying text.
386. See Fagan, supra note 75, at 235.
387. See id. at 234-43.
388. See id. at 239 (quoting Professor Ruben Gur).
389. Id.
390. Id. at 239-40.
391. See id. at 240-41.
392. Id. at 243 (citation omitted).
393. Power, supra note 23, at 109; see also Fagan, supra note 75, at 242 (calling for
the categorical exemption of this group because these are "normal" characteristics of
juveniles common to the adolescent age group).
394. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
395. Victor L. Streib, Death Penalty for Juveniles 23 (1987).
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reflection of their age. The behavior of these offenders might "change
significantly as [they] mature from adolescence to adulthood and into
middle age." '396 The imprisonment of these offenders would no doubt
be quite lengthy and would present a great opportunity for reform.397
Their reduced culpability, the small chance of deterrence and the
possibility for reform, make execution of these offenders useless and
unwarranted.
E. In Need of Clarity
The Supreme Court should directly announce this new inclusive
standard and explain it fully. Although the Court has tried to ground
its constitutional interpretations in objective criteria, even these
factors do not provide neutral principles.3 98 State counting represents
a narrow type of constitutional empiricism, but "if judges wish to be
empiricists, they should fully and honestly embrace the data at their
disposal."3 99  The state tallying calculations, when considered
dispositive, "cheapen[] the constitutional discourse. '"400
The other factors taken into account by the Court should be
emphasized and explained. If the Court is making value judgments
about what evidence to consider, "it is better that they should be
forthrightly acknowledged than hidden under a pile of cold data.""4 1
Whatever consistency the state tallying practice had given the process
of determining constitutionality is certainly lessened by the ever-
changing Supreme Court requirements for a finding of national
consensus and the debate over how exactly states are to be counted.
State counting will still have its place in a new, broader inquiry, but
"life and death should rest as well on the considerations of fairness
and justice."4 2 As prominent activist Victor Streib stated, "[t]he issue
in essence is not whether the death penalty is officially authorized but
whether it is acceptable to society." 3 More than just the number of
states that allow the practice is relevant to this inquiry.
CONCLUSION
The Court's reliance on state counting to determine the proper
scope of the Eighth Amendment is too narrow to include all
punishments human dignity forbids. Not only is this indicator often
an inaccurate reflection of society's standards, it is sometimes relied
396. Id. at 188.
397. Id.
398. Timothy Zick, Constitutional Empiricism: Quasi-Neutral Principles and
Constitutional Truths, 82 N.C. L. Rev. 115, 205 (2003).
399. Id.
400. Id.
401. Id. at 218.
402. Id.
403. Streib, supra note 361, at 34.
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on by the Court to the exclusion of other indicia. These supplemental
factors should be a part of a more inclusive Eighth Amendment
standard. Roper v. Simmons presents an opportunity for the Court to
establish and expound on the inclusive standard and use it to uphold
the Missouri Supreme Court's decision finding the juvenile death
penalty unconstitutional.
Notes & Observations
